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Summary
Source location privacy (SLP) is an important property for a large class of security-
critical wireless sensor network (WSN) applications such as monitoring and tracking.
In the seminal work on SLP, phantom routing was proposed as a viable approach to
address SLP. However, recent work has shown some limitations of phantom routing
such as poor data yield and low SLP. In this paper, we propose phantom walka-
bouts, a novel andmore general version of phantom routing, which performs phantom
routes of variable lengths. Through extensive simulations we show that phantom
walkabouts provides high SLP level than phantom routing under specific network
configuration.
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1 INTRODUCTION
A wireless sensor network (WSN) consists of a number of tiny devices, known as sensor nodes, that can sense different attributes
of the environment and use radio signals to communicate among themselves. WSNs have enabled the development of many
novel applications, including asset monitoring1, target tracking2 and environment control3 among others, with low levels of
intrusiveness. They are also expected to be deployed in safety and security-critical systems, including military4 and medical
services5. The communication protocols used in theWSNsmust therefore meet a set of stringent security and privacy requirements,
dependent on the application.
Threats to privacy in monitoring applications can be considered along two dimensions: (i) content-based threats, and (ii)
context-based threats. Content-based privacy threats relate to use of the content of the messages broadcast by sensor nodes, such
as an attacker gaining the ability to read an eavesdropped encrypted message. There has been much research addressing the issue
of providing content privacy, e.g., SPINS6, with most efforts in this area focusing on the use of cryptographic techniques. On the
other hand, context-based privacy threats focus on the context in which messages are broadcast and how information can be
observed or inferred by attackers. Context is a multi-attribute concept that encompasses situational aspects of broadcast messages,
including environmental and temporal information.
It is often desirable for the source of sensed information to be kept private in a WSN. For example, in a military application, a
soldier transmitting messages may unintentionally disclose their location, even when encryption is used. Another example is
during the monitoring of endangered species where poachers may be tempted to infer the location of the animal to capture it.
Real world examples include monitoring badgers2 and the WWF’s Wildlife Crime Technology Report7, both of which would
likely benefit from a context-based security measure. In this paper, we focus on protecting the source location.
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Techniques that protect this source location are said to provide source location privacy (SLP). SLP is important in many
application domains, though it is of utmost concern in security-critical situations. In each of these scenarios, it is important
to ensure that an attacker is difficult to find or deduce the location of the asset being monitored, whether it is a soldier or an
endangered animal. A WSN designed to forward the information collected about an asset would typically consist of the following:
a dedicated node for data collection called a sink node, the node(s) involved in sending information about these assets called
source nodes, and many other nodes in the network used to route/relay messages over multiple hops from the sources to the
sink. It has been shown that in a non-SLP protected network, even a weak attacker such as a distributed eavesdropping attacker
can backtrack along message paths through the network to find the source node and capture the asset8. Thus, there is a need to
develop SLP-aware routing algorithms.
In the seminal work on SLP, the phantom routing technique was proposed8. Phantom routing is a technique where a source
initially sends a message along a random walk (a.k.a. phantom route) of a certain length (typically a few hops). When the message
reaches a phantom node at the end of the walk, the phantom node routes the message towards the sink by flooding. Though
phantom routing should work well in theory, in practice it does not as a link failure may cause the directed random walk to fail,
resulting in a low data yield. Besides, it cannot provide state-of art SLP due to the short random walk. In this paper, we propose a
novel, more generalised technique called phantom walkabouts, of which phantom routing is a specific instance. Through extensive
simulations, we show that phantom walkabouts provides state-of-the-art levels of SLP. The main contributions of this paper are:
• We establish new random walk algorithms which address defects of random walk in phantom routing.
• We propose phantom walkabouts, a novel and more general technique than phantom routing, that help achieve high SLP
level.
• We show, via extensive simulations, the viability of phantom walkabouts. For example, under certain parameterisation,
phantom walkabouts achieves extremely high SLP.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 surveys related work in SLP and Section 3 presents the models
assumed. In Section 4 we present phantom walkabouts. The adopted system and simulation approach are outlined in Section 5.
Section 6 presents the results of the experiments conducted. We provide some discussions about our approach in Section 7.
Section 8 concludes this paper with a summary of contributions.
2 RELATEDWORK
The concept of the SLP problem was first posed around 2004 with the proposal of the panda-hunter game, where the poachers
only used network traffic flow to track the panda9.8 formalised the SLP issue based on the panda-hunter game8. Since then,
several techniques have been proposed to address SLP. The solution spectrum spans from simple solutions such as simple random
walk9 to more sophisticated techniques such as fake sources and diversionary routing10,11,12.
2.1 Random-Walk Based Techniques
In the seminal work8, the authors proposed a solution called phantom routing, where messages were sent on a directed random
walk in which the message was either sent towards or away from a certain node in the network, followed by using the flooding
routing protocol. Then a similar approach to phantom routing called single-path phantom routing was also proposed in8. Instead
of using flooding, the authors used single path routing protocols, such as shortest path routing. The combination of the random
walk together with such single path routing is often referred to as the phantom single-path routing scheme (PSRS). Phantom
routing and PSRS have received a lot of attention in the literature. On the other hand, this class of solution is known to have
weaknesses as demonstrated by13,14,15, ascribing poor SLP performance to the directed random walk reusing the routing path
leading to exposure of direction information.
For other random walk algorithms, a new algorithm using location angles was proposed to construct the random walk based
on the inclination angle between a node and its neighbour towards the sink16.17 introduced the greedy random walk (GROW). In
GROW, one random walk starts from the sink and goes to a randomly chosen receptor-node. The other random walk starts from
the source and meets the first random walk at the receptor-node. Then, the receptor-node uses the path established by the random
walk from the sink to the receptor-node to route the packet from the source to the sink. However, there is still scope to improve
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the nodes that are allocated to take part in the directed random walk. Phantom walkabouts was an algorithm also using a random
walk technique to provide SLP18. The technique used a mix of short and long random walks to achieve a higher level of SLP than
phantom routing with a bounded message overhead. Other algorithms use the random walk technique to address the SLP issue
such as forward random walk (FRW)19, trace cost based SLP protection scheme (TCSLP) for smart cities20 and random routing
scheme (RRS)21.
2.2 Fake-Source Based Techniques
Algorithms have also been developed that utilise dummy messages sent by a fake source to provide SLP. Some nodes are chosen
as fake sources and periodically send dummy messages to obfuscate the real traffic. The authors introduced a concept of fake
sources and proposed a theoretical algorithm called short-lived fake source routing (SLFSR)22. Numerous algorithms have
been also proposed with state-of-the-art fake message techniques23,11,24. These algorithms based on the fake source technique
mentioned so far can only provide SLP against the local attacker who has a local view of the network.
For the scope of the global attacker who has a full view of the network, a global protection scheme called Periodic was
developed in which every node sends a message after a fixed period25. This provided perfect protection against an attacker with a
global view of the network. The authors created a model involving traces of source detection, which was used to measure the
privacy of those traces, as well as the energy cost of providing SLP. In addition, a different approach has been developed where
statistical techniques were used to show that their global protection scheme provided high levels of SLP10. This approach does
not provide perfect global SLP as25 does, but instead provided statistically strong SLP. Their model and solution aims to make
the distribution of message broadcasts from nodes indistinguishable from a certain statistical distribution.
Perhaps the most significant disadvantage of the described fake source techniques is the volume of messages broadcast to
provide SLP. This leads to increased energy consumption and an increased number of collisions, both of which result in a
decreased packet delivery ratio. This means that a tradeoff between energy expenditure and privacy must be made26, making
dummy message schemes challenging for many large-scale networks.
2.3 Other Techniques
In addition to the techniques described above, authors in27 proposed ILP routing in which messages were delayed by different
amounts, such that they reached a similar point at a certain distance. By doing this the attacker makes less progress, due to
messages being grouped at a similar location. Another algorithm was proposed where nodes changed the chronological order of
received messages and sent messages which also change the traffic pattern, making it hard for a local adversary to track the traffic
to the source node28. Mules-saving-source protocol (MussP) use 훼-angle anonymity to provide SLP by adopting data mules
which collect the packets from sources and drop them elsewhere29.30 proposed a source location protection protocol based on
dynamic routing aims at maximising paths for data transmission to address the SLP problem. Others include using geographic
routing14 and network coding31 to address the SLP problem. In short, these techniques cause either message complexity or high
delivery latency in the network.
3 MODELS
In this section, we present the various models that underpin this work.
3.1 SLP Problem Model
The SLP problem model was based on the Panda-Hunter Game proposed by9 and first formalised by8. The aim is for the
attacker to find the location of the sources by tracing back the messages sent by the routing protocol . The aim of network
maintainers is to modify or replace such that the attacker fails to capture the source. The model is represented by the six-tuple
(퐺,푆푖푛푘, 푆푟푐,,,), where:
• 퐺 = (푉 ,퐸) defines the network graph where 푉 represents the set of sensor nodes, and 퐸 is a set of communication links
connecting two distinct nodes.
• 푆푖푛푘 ∈ 푉 is the network sink node, to which all communication in the sensor network must ultimately be routed to.
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• 푆푟푐 ∈ 푉 is the source that the sensor network monitors.
•  is the routing protocol employed by the sensors to protect the source 푆푟푐 from being acquired or tracked by the attacker.
•  is the attacker, or hunter, who seeks to acquire or capture the source 푆푟푐 through a set of movement rules.
The following sections will expand on this representation and explain aspects of this model further. Subsection 3.2 will detail
the network model including 퐺, 푆푖푛푘 and 푆푟푐. The attacker model including and will be described in Subsection 3.3.
The new routing protocol to protect SLP will be introduced in Section 4.
3.2 Network Model
A wireless sensor node is a device with a unique identifier that has limited computational capabilities and is equipped with a
radio transmitter for communication. A WSN is a set of wireless sensor nodes with communication links between pairs of nodes.
The sensor network is modelled as a graph 퐺 = (푉 ,퐸) where 푉 represents the set of nodes and 퐸 is a set of unordered pairs
that represent bidirectional links between the nodes. The nodes that are in direct communication range with a node 푛 are called
the neighbours of 푛. We assume all the nodes to be stationary, i.e., the topology of the network remains constant as well as the
neighbourhoods of all the nodes over the lifetime of the network.
There exists a distinguished node in the network called a sink, which is responsible for collecting data and which acts as a link
between the WSN and the external world. Other nodes sense data and then route the data via messages along a computed route to
the sink for collection. It is expected that there are multiple hops between the source and sink. Any node, except for the sink, can
be a data source. It is assumed that the network is event-triggered, i.e., when a node senses an object, it starts sending messages
periodically to the sink for a certain amount of time.
The messages sent are encrypted and the source node includes its identifier in the encrypted messages. The type of encryption,
be it end-to-end, pairwise or some other scheme is left undefined. Using the identifier, the sink can infer an asset’s location as it
is assumed that the network administrators will record where they put nodes. Nodes are not assumed to know their geographical
location by being equipped with Global Positioning System (GPS) chips, which is due to the increase in energy cost that would
be incurred.
3.3 Attacker Model
We assume a patient adversary model, known as a distributed eavesdropper, introduced in8. The attacker initially starts at the
sink and we assume the attacker is equipped with the necessary devices (such as directional antennas) to determine the direction
a message originated. When the attacker overhears a new message, it will move to the location of the immediate sender, i.e.,
the neighbour that last forwarded the message. Once the source has been found, the attacker will no longer move. However, the
attacker does not read the messages it overhears, so cannot obtain the contents of a message.
There are two more things that need to explain: First, in this model, the attacker starts at the sink since the sink is the one
location in the network where the attacker is guaranteed to eavesdrop any message from the source, irrespective of the routing
protocol used. The attacker could potentially start at any location in the network, but may not receive messages due to the location
not being on the route from the source to the sink. Second, as we focus on a distributed attacker with a small visibility of the
network, the techniques are not designed to protect against a global attacker who has a global view of the network. The reason for
this is that for attackers to gain global visibility they will need to expend significant resources. For example, they need build
towers with sensitive long range directional antennas or deploy many attackers presenting in the network each with a small visible
range. Now we sum up the attacker model below for clarity:
• The attacker is a person physically present in the network.
• The attacker starts at the sink as that is the one location guaranteed to receive messages from the source.
• The attacker has sufficient directional antennas to detect the direction from which a message originates.
• The attacker moves to the location of the proximate node when it eavesdrops a new message.
• The attacker have a local view of the network.
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• The attacker does not jam the network (as that would reveal its position).
• The attacker does not do complicated traffic analysis or physically attack the network.
• The attacker does not have knowledge of the routing protocol in the network.
3.4 Privacy Model
The overall objective of any WSN-based SLP solution is to ensure that the source (at a given location) is never captured. As such,
a notion of time boundedness termed as safety period in the literature8 which is the number of messages sent that an attacker
needs to capture the source has been developed. The higher the safety period is, the higher the source location privacy level.
However, using the safety period metric means that simulation runtime is unbounded and potentially very large.
We use an alternative, but analogous, definition for safety period for each network size and network configuration, and obtain
the safety period when protectionless flooding is used as the routing protocol8. Flooding is used as it has been argued to provide
the lowest SLP level, hence any SLP improvement is due to the SLP-aware technique8. The safety period is then obtained by
increasing this value to account for the attacker potentially making bad moves.
4 PHANTOMWALKABOUTS
In the section, we propose a novel SLP routing protocol, termed as phantom walkabouts, which is a more generic version of
phantom routing strategy that addresses the impact caused by small random walks in phantom routing †. Phantom walkabouts
generalises phantom routing with variable random walk lengths, which we will show to provide better performance than phantom
routing. We explain the rationale behind the protocol and algorithms for forming the new random walk, the biased random walk
and the overall phantom walkabouts algorithm. Table 1 summarises the notation used in this paper.
TABLE 1 Commonly used notations
Notation Description
푚푠푔 The normal message
푑푖푟 The random walk set of a message
푑푖푟 The random walk direction of a message
푑푖푟 The biased random walk direction of a message
푏푖푎푠푒푑 The probability of biased random walk
푓푙표표푑푖푛푔 The time taken (seconds) of protectionless flooding
푃푠푎푓푒푡푦 The safety period (seconds)
푀푠 The message with the short random walk
푀푙 The message with the long random walk
Δ푠푠 The distance in hops between the sink and the source
ℎ푤푎푙푘 The remaining hops of the random walk
†https://bitbucket.org/Chen_Gu/slp-algorithms-tinyos
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(a) Short random walk (b) Long random walk
FIGURE 1 Short and long random walk routing examples
4.1 Motivation of Phantom Walkabouts
Phantom routing is a routing protocol to provide SLP, and it works by altering a flooding routing protocol to consist of an initial
directed random walk followed by flooding. In the random walk phase data are transmitted between two neighbouring nodes
through single-hop communication. Therefore, the random walk length is usually very short in the phantom routing since long
random walk could cause the directed random walk to fail, resulting in a low data yield.
Figure 1 shows the typical scenario during an execution of phantom routing where the source sends a message to a phantom
node which lies somewhere between itself and the sink. When the phantom node floods the message to the sink, the first movement
of the attacker is towards the phantom node (see Figure 1a). However, it would be beneficial to have the first movements of the
attacker to be away from the source, as shown in Figure 1b. To achieve this, a longer random walk can be used, where the length
of the walk exceeds the sink-source distance.
As such, we conjecture that phantom walkabouts with a mix of short and long random walk will achieve a higher level of SLP
than phantom routing. We denote a phantom walkabouts parametrisation by 푃푊 (푚, 푛), where 푚, 푛 denote the number of short
and long random walk respectively to be performed in a cycle. 푃푊 (1, 1) denotes a repeating sequence of 1 short random walk
followed by 1 long random walk. Later, in this paper, we investigate the SLP levels and associated receive ratio of 푃푊 (1, 0),
푃푊 (1, 1), 푃푊 (1, 2), and 푃푊 (0, 1).
4.2 New RandomWalk Algorithm in Phantom Walkabouts
In phantom routing, each node maintains two sets for all its neighbours: (i) CloserSinkSet which contains all the neighbours
whose hop counts to the sink are smaller than or equal to the node’s hop count to the sink, and (ii) FurtherSinkSet which includes
neighbours with a larger hop count to the sink. After neighbour nodes are partitioned, the source randomly picks one of these two
sets and sends normal messages to one neighbour in the chosen set. During the random walk phase, messages are always sent to
the neighbour in the chosen set. If a message is blocked (e.g., there is no neighbour in the chosen set so messages cannot be
forwarded) the random walk phase stops. In other cases, when a message travelled 푠 hops (assuming random walk length is 푠), it
has finished the random walk phase. When the random walk phase ends, if a message does not reach the sink node, the message
then floods the network so it reaches the sink node.
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(a) Neighbours division in phantom routing (b) Neighbours division in phantom walkabouts
FIGURE 2 Comparisons of neighbour divisions in phantom routing and phantom walkabouts
However, in the random walk phase of phantom routing some exceptional situations have never been considered. For example,
not every node could become a phantom node; random walk exceptionally terminates at some nodes. Therefore, we describe a
new random walk algorithm to deal with neighbour nodes division and exceptional termination of random walks.
• Neighbour division in random walk phase
Different from phantom routing where each node’s neighbours are divided into two sets, each node’s neighbours are now
divided into four sets in different directions‡. This division can be done as follows: We choose a node in the network as
a landmark node. As shown in phantom routing a landmark node divides a node’s neighbours into two sets by flooding
beacon messages, the chosen landmark node in phantom walkabouts also floods beacon messages to divide a node’s
neighbours into other two sets, thus achieving the neighbour division into four sets. In other words, in total two waves of
beacon messages are flooded by the two selected landmark nodes. Figure 2 demonstrates the difference of neighbours
division. Given a grid network configuration, in the random walk phase of phantom routing half of the nodes in the network
could be used as phantom nodes (see Figure 2a) whereas almost all the nodes could become phantom nodes in the new
random walk routing (see Figure 2b).
• Random walk termination handling in random walk phase
If a message is blocked during the random walk phase (e.g., messages reach the border of the network), a new message
direction will be chosen and assigned to the 퐶푙표푠푒푟푆푖푛푘푆푒푡. This procedure is demonstrated in Figure 3a. In certain
extreme situations when 퐶푙표푠푒푟푆푖푛푘푆푒푡 is void, the random walk terminates and the node becomes a phantom node.
Because we believe the phantom node is farthest from the real source node and ensures the safety of the source node that
its location will be hard to track. When a message travels 푙 hops (assuming random walk length is 푙), it has finished the
random walk phase.
Similar to phantom routing, if a message does not reach the sink after the random walk phase, the flooding phase will start
once the random walk ends. The algorithms of these two phases are shown in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2.
‡Observe that this does not restrict the network configuration to be a grid, but the nodes can be partitioned into these four sets.
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(a) Illustration of random walk routing in phantom walka-
bouts
(b) Illustration of bad random walks and biased random
walks in SourceCorner configuration
FIGURE 3 Random walk in phantom walkabouts
Algorithm 1 Random Walk Phase in Phantom Walkabouts
1: procedure RANDOM WALK PHASE(푚푠푔, 푙)
2: 푚푠푔.푑푖푟 ← ⊥
3: 푚푠푔.푑푖푟 ← ⊥
4: 푚푠푔.ℎ푤푎푙푘 ← 푙
5: 푚푠푔.푑푖푟 ← CHOOSEONESET(푚푠푔)
6: while 푚푠푔.ℎ푤푎푙푘 ≠ 0 do
7: 푚푠푔.푑푖푟 ← CHOOSEONENEIGHBOUR(푚푠푔.푑푖푟)
8: if ISREACHSINK(푚푠푔) = 푇 푟푢푒 then
9: 푚푠푔.ℎ푤푎푙푘 ← 0
10: break
11: end if
12: if 푚푠푔.푑푖푟 = ⊥ then
13: 푚푠푔.푑푖푟 ← CHOOSEONENEIGHBOUR(퐶푙표푠푒푟푆푖푛푘푆푒푡)
14: end if
15: 푚푠푔.ℎ푤푎푙푘 ← 푚푠푔.ℎ푤푎푙푘 − 1
16: FORWARDMESSAGE(푚푠푔.푑푖푟)
17: end while
18: end procedure
4.3 Biased RandomWalk Algorithm in Phantom Walkabouts
The new random walk routing algorithm proposed in Subsection 4.2, especially a long random walk ensures that phantom nodes
are far away from the real source node. However, there is a weakness that needs to be addressed for certain topologies. Specifically,
consider the configuration where a source node lies in the corner of a grid and the sink node in the middle area of the network.
As the source is located in the corner, messages will always be transmitted towards the sink node. Owing to the random nature
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Algorithm 2 Flooding Phase in Phantom Walkabouts
1: procedure FLOODING PHASE(푚푠푔)
2: if 푚푠푔.ℎ푤푎푙푘 = 0 then
3: if ISREACHSINK(푚푠푔) = 퐹푎푙푠푒 then
4: FLOODING(푚푠푔)
5: end if
6: end if
7: end procedure
of the walk, the random walk may take path through the sink node. In this case, the attacker will notice the message and will
move towards the source node, increasing the chance of a source capture. As shown in Figure 3b, the bad random walk is always
forwarding messages closer to the sink, so the attacker can always move backwards to the source location.
To address this issue, we developed a biased random walk based on our new random walk algorithm proposed in Subsection 4.2,
for the specific configuration so as to avoid the risk of a random walk close to the attacker. In the biased random walk, messages
are not forwarded in the direction of the sink. Instead, messages are transmitted by following border nodes to avoid being captured
in the random walk phase. Biased random routing is described as follows and shown in Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 2.
• The source first chooses a set out of four neighbour sets, and then assigns a direction from the chosen set for a message.
The chosen direction is called the biased direction (푑푖푟). The message direction푑푖푟 is always following the 푑푖푟.
• When a node receives a message, the random value 푟 ∈ [0, 1] is generated. The fixed parameter 푏푖푎푠푒푑 is set in the
experiments to make sure a message has a high probability of walking along the previous biased direction. Normally the
value of 푏푖푎푠푒푑 is set larger than 0.5 but less than 1. For instance, if 푏푖푎푠푒푑 is set to 0.7, it indicates the message has a 70%
probability of being transmitted along the previous biased direction. The node decides the message direction푑푖푟 by the
following equation:
푑푖푟(푟,푏푖푎푠푒푑 ,푑푖푟,푑푖푟) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
푑푖푟 if 푟 ∈ [0,푏푖푎푠푒푑]
푑푖푟 ⧵ {푑푖푟} otherwise.
(1)
• When the message direction is blocked, it indicates that the message reaches the end of this direction. The message will
choose a new biased direction to continue the random walk until random walk finishes. If the new biased random walk
direction is empty again, the random walk phase stops. Then the flooding phase starts.
4.4 Phantom Walkabouts
In this section, we formalise the phantom walkabouts technique, which extends the phantom routing protocol by adopting variable
lengths of phantom routing. When a source node routes a message푀 using phantom walkabouts, a decision is needed regarding
whether푀 goes on a short (푀푠) or long (푀푙) random walk route. The sequencing of messages looks like as follows:
푀푠,⋯ ,푀푠,
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
푚
푀푙,⋯ ,푀푙,
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
푛
푀푠,⋯ ,푀푠,
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
푚
푀푙,⋯ ,푀푙,
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
푛
⋯
Therefore, we observe that the phantom walkabouts 푃푊 (푚, 푛) consists of 푚 messages on short random walk and 푛 messages
on long random walk, before the cycle is repeated. The phantom walkabouts adopts all the techniques described in Subsection 4.2,
Subsection 4.3 and Subsection 4.4. As shown in Equation 2, when a message is푀푠, the new random walk algorithm is adopted.
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Algorithm 3 Biased Random Walk in Phantom Walkabouts
1: procedure BIASED RANDOM WALK(푚푠푔, 푙, 푏푖푎푠푒푑)
2: 푚푠푔.푑푖푟 ← ⊥
3: 푚푠푔.푑푖푟 ← ⊥
4: 푚푠푔.푑푖푟 ← ⊥
5: 푚푠푔.ℎ푤푎푙푘 ← 푙
6: 푚푠푔.푑푖푟 ← CHOOSEONESET(푚푠푔)
7: while 푚푠푔.ℎ푤푎푙푘 ≠ 0 do
8: 푚푠푔.푑푖푟 ← CHOOSEONENEIGHBOUR(푚푠푔.푑푖푟)
9: if 푚푠푔.푑푖푟 = ⊥ then
10: 푚푠푔.푑푖푟 ← 푚푠푔.푑푖푟
11: end if
12: 푟← GENERATERANDOMNUMBER(0, 1)
13: if ISREACHSINK(푚푠푔) = 푇 푟푢푒 then
14: 푚푠푔.ℎ푤푎푙푘 ← 0
15: break
16: end if
17: if 푟 ≥ 푏푖푎푠푒푑 then
18: 푚푠푔.푑푖푟 ← CHOOSEONENEIGHBOUR(푚푠푔.푑푖푟 ⧵ 푚푠푔.푑푖푟)
19: end if
20: if 푚푠푔.푑푖푟 = ⊥ then
21: 푚푠푔.푑푖푟 ← CHOOSEONENEIGHBOUR(푚푠푔.푑푖푟)
22: 푚푠푔.푑푖푟 ← 푚푠푔.푑푖푟
23: end if
24: 푚푠푔.ℎ푤푎푙푘 ← 푚푠푔.ℎ푤푎푙푘 − 1
25: FORWARDMESSAGE(푚푠푔.푑푖푟)
26: end while
27: end procedure
On the other hand, if a message to be푀푙, the biased random walk algorithm is only used when the sink in the centre area of the
network. Otherwise, the new random walk algorithm is used. Finally, the phantom walkabouts algorithm is shown in Algorithm 4.
Phantom Walkabouts
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
Short random walk message (푀푠) ←→ New random walk algorithm
Long random walk message (푀푙)
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
Sink in the centre area ←→ Biased random walk algorithm
Otherwise ←→ New random walk algorithm
(2)
With long random walks in phantom walkabouts, the receive ratio is low due to the unreliability of network links32, causing a
proportion of messages to never reach the sink. Therefore, there is a need to add a mechanism to provide high message delivery.
Retransmission will be used to ensure reliability along the route. It works as follows: When a message is transmitted from node 푗
to a neighbour node 푘, 푘 may send an acknowledgement (ACK) message when it has received the message from 푗. If 푗 does
not receive any ACK message from 푘, it means that the message may not have been successfully delivered to 푘. In this case,
푗 will resend a same message to 푘. Retransmission will stop when an ACK message is received or the maximum number of
retransmissions have been sent.
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Algorithm 4 Phantom Walkabouts
1: procedure PHANTOM WALKABOUTS(푚, 푛)
2: 푚′, 푛′ ← 푚, 푛
3: while 푇 푟푢푒 do
4: if 푚′ > 0 then
5: 푚푠푔 ← GENERATESHORTMESSAGE() ⊳ Source generates a message containing short random walk length
6: ROUTING(푚푠푔) ⊳ The routing algorithm is based on the Equation 2
7: 푚′ ← 푚′ − 1
8: else if 푚′ = 0 ∧ 푛′ > 0 then
9: 푚푠푔 ← GENERATELONGMESSAGE() ⊳ Source generates a message containing long random walk length
10: ROUTING(푚푠푔)
11: 푛′ ← 푛′ − 1
12: else
13: 푚′, 푛′ ← 푚, 푛
14: end if
15: end while
16: end procedure
4.5 Summary: Difference between Phantom Routing and Phantom Walkabouts
As pointing out some shortcomings of phantom routing, we introduce phantom walkabouts which addresses a number of
weaknesses in phantom routing. This section briefly summarises the difference between the phantom routing and phantom
walkabouts shown in Table 2.
4.6 Problem Statement
In a WSN, phantom walkabouts is used as a routing protocol to deliver messages from the source(s) to the sink. When an attacker
is initially located at the sink and starts receiving messages sent by the source(s) to the sink, an important problem is to analyse the
impact on SLP of phantom walkabouts under various parameterisations. Formally, the problem specification is shown in Figure 4.
Given:
• A WSN topology 퐺 = (푉 ,퐸) where 푉 is a set of wireless sensor nodes and 퐸 is a set of edges or links,
• A phantom walkabouts protocol 푃푊 (푚, 푛) where a pair (푚, 푛) for short and long random walk lengths,
• A distributed eavesdropper attacker that is located at the sink initially,
• A network configuration ℂ where a source locates in the corner and a sink is in the centre, and
• A safety period 훿,
Objective:
• Evaluate the performance of 푃푊 (푚, 푛) with various parameterisations of (푚, 푛) over 훿 in 퐺, ℂ and.
FIGURE 4 Problem statement: Evaluation of phantom walkabouts with various parameterisations
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Difference Phantom Routing Phantom Walkabouts
The length of random walk The length of random walk is fixed toa few hops
1. The messages contain long random
walk which exceeds sink-source
distance
2. The short and long random walks
repeat in the phantom walkabouts
The neighbour sets of a node
The neighbours of a node are
classified into two sets: the
CloserSinkSet and the FurtherSinkSet
More than two neighbour sets of a
node are classified depending on the
choice of the landmark nodes in the
network (e.g., four sets in this paper)
The number of phantom nodes
Half the nodes in the network can be
chosen as the phantom nodes (except
for the source and the sink)
All the nodes in the network can be
chosen as the phantom nodes (except
for the source and the sink)
Random walk termination
Random walk stops in some
exceptional cases (e.g., a message
reaches the border node and cannot be
forwarded)
Random walk continues when facing
exceptional cases
Random walk techniques in different
network configurations
The fixed random walk technique is
used for all network configurations
Biased random walk technique is used
for special network configuration (e.g.,
SourceCorner configuration)
Acknowledgement messages No Yes
TABLE 2 The Differences between phantom routing and phantom walkabouts
5 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section we describe the simulation environment, source selection, network configuration and safety period calculation that
were used to generate the results presented in Section 6.
5.1 Simulation Setup
The TOSSIM (V2.1.2) simulation environment was used in all experiments33. TOSSIM is a discrete event simulator capable
of accurately modelling sensor nodes and the modes of communications between them. An experiment is made of a single
execution of the simulation environment using a specified protocol configuration, network nodes and safety period. An experiment
terminated when any source node had been captured by an attacker during the safety period or the safety period had expired.
5.2 Parameter Setup
A square grid network layout of size 푛×푛 was used in all experiments, with 푛 ∈ {11, 15, 21, 25}, i.e., networks with 121, 225, 441
and 625 nodes respectively. The source and sink nodes were distinct and assigned positions in the SourceCorner configuration
from27, where the sink is in the centre and the source in the corner. The source period at which messages are sent from the real
source is set to 1 second per message. The node neighbourhoods were generating using ideal model. Nodes were located 4.5
meters apart. Noise models were created using the first 2500 lines of casino-lab.txt§. At least 2000 repeats were performed
for each combination of parameters.
§casino-lab.txt is a noise sample file provided with TOSSIM.
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In Subsection 4.3, we introduced parameter 푏푖푎푠푒푑 used to implement biased random walk. The larger value of 푏푖푎푠푒푑 is,
the bigger is the chance that the random walk will avoid walking close to the sink. In the simulation, we set this value to 0.9.
When choosing the length of the short and long random walks for phantom walkabouts, a variety of parameter combinations
were considered. Our experiments set the short random walk series 푆 = {2, 3,… , 0.5 × Δ푠푠}, and long random walk series
퐿 = {2 + Δ푠푠,… , 1.5 × Δ푠푠}, where Δ푠푠 is the sink-source distance. In the phantom walkabouts, the short and long random
walks are randomly generated from 푆 and 퐿 during simulation runtime. The maximum times of message retransmission was set
to 5 times.
Intuitively, the safety period captures the time period during which the asset will be at the same location. We calculate different
safety periods 푃푠푎푓푒푡푦 as the following, where 푓푙표표푑푖푛푔 is the time taken of an assert being captured for protectionless flooding.
푃푠푎푓푒푡푦 = 1.3 × 푓푙표표푑푖푛푔 (3)
The reason why we choose a factor value 1.3 is because the safety period is longer than the the time taken of protectionless
flooding so attackers have time potentially making bad moves. In fact other factor values are also applied. The 푓푙표표푑푖푛푔 for each
network size and source period, for protectionless flooding is shown in Table 3¶. Thus the 푃푠푎푓푒푡푦 is calculated based on the푓푙표표푑푖푛푔 when the source period is 1 second per message for each network size respectively.
TABLE 3 Time taken (seconds) of protectionless flooding
Network
Size
Source Period (seconds/message)
2.0 1.0 0.5 0.25
11×11 19.38 9.93 5.29 3.04
15×15 27.47 13.98 7.39 4.07
21×21 40.50 20.40 10.56 5.64
25×25 48.48 24.59 12.72 6.71
6 RESULTS
In this section we will use a metric called capture ratio to evaluate the SLP level. The capture ratio is the percentage of runs in
which the source was captured. For example, if the attacker captures the source 20 times within the given safety period out of 100
simulation repeats, the capture ratio is 20%. The lower the capture ratio is, the higher the source location privacy level. Besides,
we will also analyse other three key metrics: (i) receive ratio: the percentage of messages sent by the source and received at the
sink, (ii) message latency: the time it takes a message sent by the source to be received at the sink, and (iii) messages sent per
second: the number of messages sent by all nodes in the network per second.
As explained earlier in Subsection 4.1, we hypothesised that a short random walk will initially direct the attacker towards the
source while a longer random walk will direct the attacker away from the source, thereby possibly increasing the SLP level. In
this section, we seek to determine whether the hypotheses hold. We will first evaluate the performance of 푃푊 (푚, 푛) by varying
푚 and 푛, and add other state-of-art SLP-aware routing protocols and phantom routing as a baseline for comparison.
6.1 Results of Phantom Walkabouts
6.1.1 Receive Ratio
A high receive ratio above 90% is observed. Fewer messages were delivered with larger networks. This suggests that the attacker
was hearing most of the source messages, meaning that the privacy level imparted by the phantom walkabouts is due to the
efficiency of the protocol and not due to the unreliability of the network. Another observation is that the low source period causes
the low receive ratio but not significant. This is due to the traffic congestion with the low source period.
¶The results are generated from 10000 repeats of protectionless flooding.
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6.1.2 Capture Ratio
In Figure 5a, over 40% of capture ratio was observed, thereby confirming our conjecture that only short random walk cannot
provide high level of SLP. Sequentially we added one long random walk in the phantom walkabouts (i.e., 푃푊 (1, 1)). The results
show that the capture ratio decreases to less than 10% (see Figure 6a). With the increase of long random walk, the capture ratio
will further decrease. In the extreme case that no short random walk in the phantom walkabouts, the capture ratio is near 0%,
providing near-optimal SLP. However, in this case the message latency increases since messages need to travel though long
routes to the sink (see Figure 8c).
6.1.3 Message Latency
The message latency is affected by the network sizes and number of long messages in one phantom walkabouts repeat. A large
network size causes latency increase due to the long distance between the source and the sink. In addition, more long random
walks ensure that messages costs more time to the phantom nodes before reaching the sink. In Figure 5c, the latency is between
100 milliseconds and 200 milliseconds because of no long random walk in 푃푊 (1, 0). However, the latency escalates to a new
level from 300 milliseconds to 1000 milliseconds in 푃푊 (0, 1) (see Figure 8c) due to no short random walk message in phantom
walkabouts repeat.
6.1.4 Messages Sent per Second
As the different network sizes being varied each has a different safety period, the number of messages sent has been normalised
with respect to the simulation length to allow the results to be compared. The results show that (i) the number of messages sent
varies for different network sizes due to the long safety period; (ii) Lower source periods (i.e., faster message rates) require more
messages sent per second, and (iii) the different combinations of short and long random walk in phantom walkabouts do not
heavily influence the messages sent.
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FIGURE 5 Results of PW(1,0): Only short random walk in the phantom walkabouts
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FIGURE 6 Results of PW(1,1): Short random walk followed by one long random walk in the phantom walkabouts
6.2 Comparison with Other SLP-Aware Routing Protocols
Previous results have shown that our proposed routing protocol can achieve near 0% capture ratio at the best (see Figure 7a
and Figure 8a) and very high receive ratio. In this section, to further investigate the performance of our solution, phantom routing
is compared as the baseline routing protocol. Besides, we added other two state-of-art protocols that can also achieve SLP for
comparison: DynamicSPR24 and ILP Routing27. We choose these two because they adopt different techniques to provide SLP:
fake sources and message delay respectively. Those two routing protocols are also instances of two classes of SLP protocols:
spatially-aware protocol and temporal-aware protocol respectively34.
The results were generated under the simulation environment as the same as our solution. All the source period is set to 1
message per second. The results of our proposed solution is from 푃푊 (1, 2) (see Figure 7). Specific parameters for other protocols
are listed as follows:
• Phantom Routing: The randomwalk is selected as fixed 8 hops due to the fact that long randomwalks may provide good SLP.
• DynamicSPR: The parameter Rnd determines how many fake messages are sent over the lifetime of a temporary fake
source. It sends either 1 or 2 messages randomly chosen over the duration.
• ILP Routing: This algorithm has four parameters: the maximum walk length, the buffer size, the number of messages to
group and the probability the message is sent directly to the sink. As the maximum walk length is simply to provide a finite
bound in large networks, it was set to 100 hops. The number of messages to group was 1 message. The buffer size was set
to 10 messages. Finally, the probability of sending a message directly to the sink was set to 20% as it was identified as a
good setting in27.
Now we make such observations from Figure 9:
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FIGURE 7 Results of PW(1,2): Short random walk followed by two long random walk in the phantom walkabouts
• Phantom routing produces 20% to 25% of capture ratio. However, the receive ratio is 80%, meaning that an amount of
messages cannot be received by the sink (see Figure 9b). Therefore, the low messages sent and capture ratio are due to the
low receive ratio (see Figure 9a and Figure 9d). The low receive ratio proves the fact that messages are lost in transmission
between two neighbouring nodes without ACK messages.
• The results show DynamicSPR, ILP Routing and our proposed solution can achieve near-optimal SLP (see Figure 9a).
Meanwhile, the receive ratio of DynamicSPR is near 100% and 80% is observed for ILP Routing (see Figure 9b). However,
the weaknesses of both algorithms are to introduce much overheads to achieve such high level of SLP. Specifically, for
DynamicSPR the messages sent are higher than our solution and increase greatly with larger network size (see Figure 9d);
latency in ILP Routing doubled higher than our solution (see Figure 9c).
• The phantom walkabouts provides much better SLP and much reliable receive ratio than phantom routing but higher
message latency and messages sent. This is due to the use of ACK messages, which increases the time costs and number of
messages sent between two neighbouring nodes. Therefore, the trade-offs need to be made between SLP and other attributes.
Overall, DynamicSPR and ILP Routing can achieve high level of SLP but not bounding the overheads, which restrict their
practical applications. For example, DynamicSPR can only be deployed in the network that nodes are with power scavengers (e.g.,
solar panels) to support high energy consumption; ILP Routing can be deployed in the delay-tolerant networks, and phantom
routing can be deployed in the networks without very high level of SLP requirement.
7 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss some issues and observations that arose as a result of this work.
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FIGURE 8 Results of PW(0,1): Only long random walk in the phantom walkabouts
7.1 Flooding phase in phantom walkabouts
In this paper, we use flooding to deliver messages from the source to the sink. The reasons we adopt flooding are: (i) the phantom
walkabouts and phantom routing are comparable because they both use flooding; (ii) flooding is simple, high reliable, and it
requires no costly topology maintenance nor complex route discovery; (iii) flooding is used as it is the routing algorithm that offers
no SLP8. Any improvement in SLP levels is then due to the SLP algorithm used. However, flooding has several shortcomings
such as overlap and energy consumption35. Therefore, the flooding protocol can be replaced by other enhanced protocols such as
gossiping36. In this case, the impact of using gossiping instead of flooding on SLP needs to be investigated.
7.2 Different attacker models
In this paper, we have assumed a distributed eavesdropper that backtracks on the network traffic to capture the source within the
safety period. This type of attacker monitors a range of messages transmitted and quickly move to the position where data were
sent from. We use this attacker model due to its common adoption. However, an alternative to this would be a patient attacker
model. For a patient attacker, he could wait at one location to gather information. After receiving a number of messages, it could
choose to move based on the information gathered. A problem with this attacker model is that waiting reduces the number of
moves that the attacker could potentially take. If the attacker waits too long, then the safety period will expire and it will fail to
capture the source. While the patient attacker is an alternative attacker model, it may not always perform well. Another possible
type of attacker can deduce the routing algorithm in the network by analysing the network traffic. However, this attacker needs to
contain more resources including powerful computation and enough storage. Dealing with other attacker models will be part of
our future work.
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FIGURE 9 Comparison of Other SLP-aware Routing Protocols
7.3 Choice of Parameters
The proposed routing protocol relies on the choice of parameters short and long random walks in the phantom walkabouts. The
parameterisations can be finely tuned and generated by the system administrator or application developer for practical scenarios.
For example, in the latency-aware network scenario that messages need to be delivered to the sink within the latency deadline
(e.g., battlefield applications), too many long random walk messages should not be used in the phantom walkabouts. In this case,
a trade-off need to be made between the capture ratio and message latency. Overall the parameters should vary to fit the specific
network environment.
7.4 Lack of Testbed Experiments
Our results were generated from TOSSIM rather than real testbeds. The reason is that current testbeds are not very fit for testing
our solution. For example, the topology of the testbeds such as FlockLab37 has insufficient space around the sink for messages to
be routed so that the efficiency of our protocol cannot be fully tested; FIT/IoT-LAB38 is a large scale open experimental IoT
testbed. However, the network in FIT/IoT-LAB has a very dense topology. What is ideally required is a testbed where node
distributed is uniform.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we firstly show the limitations of phantom routing algorithm. Then we have proposed a novel technique called
phantom walkabouts, which extends the phantom routing, to provide a better level of SLP than phantom routing. Phantom
walkabouts proposes to interleave sequences of short random walks and long random walks to attempt to make the attacker move
in the wrong direction, as opposed to phantom routing (with small random walks) where an attacker moves towards the source.
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We also implement it with messages retransmission technique to achieve very high data yield. We have shown that phantom
walkabouts provides much better SLP and receive ratio than phantom routing and equal SLP with other state-of-art SLP solutions.
For future work, we plan to investigate phantom walkabouts with dynamic short and long random walks, i.e., in our current
experiments, we use one given value for short random walks and a different value for long random walks in one phantom
walkabouts repeat. However, this needs not be the case. In fact, we conjecture that better performance can be achieved by
dynamically varying the number of the short and long random walks. As described in Section 7, it would also be informative to
consider alternative intelligent attacker models and testbed experiments.
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